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Abstract 
Under the current mixed system of planning and markets in the Chinese 
urban consumption sector, marginal decision rules in market economies are 
directly applicable. The demand functions in such mixed system involve not 
only market prices and income but also the state prices and quotas. Besides 
substitution and income effects, consumers respond to changes in the price 
of the commodity with government intervention as an implied income effect in 
the same way as they respond to changes in real income. Changes in the state 
price and/or state quota have no substitution effect. Consumers would 
perceive the changes as a result of anticipated income effect through their 
equivalent income variation. The policy implications involve the importance of 
not ignoring the free market in the state planning process. To monitor grain 
consumption, the government should increase the state grain prices and/or 
decrease the state grain quotas. 
Chinese Urban Consumption Behavior under the 
Current Mixed System of Planning and Markets 
Introduction 
Chinese urban grain consumption was controlled by straight rationing from 
1955 to 1978. Under that system, the government was the sole grain seller. The 
quantity rationed to each urban resident was fixed and varied with a consumer's 
age and type of work. The composition of grain rationing usually changed each 
month due to supply changes. The consumer prices were fixed and were subsidized 
by the government. 
Since 1978, a series of economic reforms have been adopted in China to reduce 
central planning and to give market forces an increasing role in economic 
decision making. In rural areas, the People's Commune system was replaced with 
production responsibility system, which then became the contract responsibility 
system in 1985. Under this new system, a farm household is allocated a piece 
of collective land and is responsible for all production activities. In return, 
the farmer is obligated to sell certain amount of major outputs including grain, 
cotton, and oil-bearing crops to the state at prices that are lower than market 
prices. After fulfilling the state quotas, farmers may then sell the surplus in 
free markets. 
In urban areas, grain rationing and the price subsidy are still in effect. 
However, the availability of grain cormnodi ties on free markets provides consumers 
with feasible alternatives. Consumers can purchase more or better food grains 
from free markets at free market prices. Since market prices are higher than 
state subsidized prices, consumers will not go to free markets unless there are 
certain advantages. The subsidized rationing quotas must be binding if grain 
commodities from rationing and free markets are perfect substitutes. If the 
rationing quotas have a surplus, consumers can get a coupon to trade for fine 
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grain commodities or any other commodities. This is the prevailing system even 
though it is against government regulations. As grain commodities become 
available on free markets, the state rationing associated with the price subsidy 
is no longer a way to restrict grain consumption. It guarantees urban consumers 
a certain amount of grain for consumption at lower prices. It is actually an 
income transfer to urban consumers from taxpayers. 
Most of the literature dealing with Chinese urban grain consumption behavior 
under the current mixed system of planning and markets is descriptive in nature. 
Some exceptions include Sicular (1988), Pan and Johnson (1989), and Chern and 
Wang (1990). Sicular developed a theoretical model in a general equilibrium 
framework and used an income transfer to reflect the interaction between planned 
and market sectors. Pan and Johnson modeled urban grain consumption and the 
interaction between planning and market economies. The results from an 
associated empirical model show that the demand function possesses the basic 
features ascribed by classical consumer theory. The complication is an 
additional demand shifter due to government intervention. Following the "matched 
pair" of demand functions derived by Deaton (1981), one rationed and the other 
unrationed, Chern and Wang estimated Chinese urban consumption using the almost 
ideal demand system. They found that imposing rationing would create income and 
substitution effects associated with the changes in rationed quantity and prices. 
The objective of this study is to analyze how consumers behave in the mixed 
system of planning and markets and how the planned and market sectors interact 
with each other. To accomplish this objective, a theoretical model incorporating 
both planned and market economies is developed. The model is followed by the 
conventional static analysis and policy analysis. The last section summarizes 
the results and discusses their implications. 
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The Model 
Consider a price-taking urban resident consuming grain and nongrain 
commodities. Assuming rational behavior and local nonsatiation, this consumer 
will choose a most preferred bundle of grain and nongrain from the set of 
feasible alternatives in order to maximize utility, subject to budget constraint 
with equality: 




where U is a strict quasi-concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; G, 
and Gr are quantities of grain commodities from the state and the market, 
respectively; X is the quantity of nongrain commodity; P, and Pf are the state 
price and market price of the grain commodity, respectively; Px is the price of 
the nongrain commodity; I is income; and G is total grain commodity. 
Assuming Gf is positive and substituting (3) into (1) and (2), the Lagrangian 
expression for this maximization problem is 
(4) L- f(G, X)+ A[l + (Pf- P,)G,- PfG- PxXJ, 
where A is a multiplier of the marginal utility of income. 
The first-order conditions for the maximum give 
(5) aL;aG- af;aG- Pf- o, 
(6) aL;ax- af;ax- Px- o, 
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(7) 8L/8).- I + (Pf- P,)G,- PfG- P,.X- 0. 
The ratio of the first two equations yields 
(8) (8f/8G)/(8f/8X) - Pf/Px. 
That is, the rate of commodity substitution must equal the rate of market prices 
for the maximum. 
The Equations (5) and (6) can also be written as 
(9) {Bf/BG)/Pf - (Bf/BX)/Px. 
That is, the marginal utility divided by market price must be the same for all 
commodities at maximum. Equations (8) and (9) indicate that only market prices 
matter in the marginal consumption decision. 
The assumption of strict quasi-concavity ensures that the second-order 
condition is satisfied at any point at which the first-order condition is 
satisfied. Solving the first-order conditions gives the demand functions for G 
and X, 
(10) G f(Pf, P., (Pf - P,)G,, I) 
and 
(11) X - f(Pf, P., (Pf - P,)G,. I). 
The demand functions have two properties: (1) the demand for any commodity 
is a single-valued function of prices and income plus a difference term between 
the market price and state price times the state quota; and (2) demand functions 
are homogeneous of degree zero in prices, including state price, and income. 
That is, if all prices and income change in the same proportion, the quantities 
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demanded remain unchanged. 
The question is, what is (Pr- P,)G,? In Figure 1, D represents the demand 
curve and S denotes the supply curve for the grain commodity. Since the 
government supplies grain to consumers up to G, at state price P,, the supply 
curve is horizontal until it reaches to G,, then it slopes upward. Pr and G are 
market equilibrium price and quantity. Under the current policy regime, 
urban consumers are guaranteed the consumable grain commodity G, at subsidized 
price P5 • Consumption beyond G5 , in this case G - G5 - Gf, needs to move to the 
free market at market price. Thus, (Pr- P,)G, is the change in the consumer's 
surplus due to the state price subsidy for consumption, G,. 
To better interpret the model, we define (Pr- P,)G, as equivalent income 
variation, EIV, an approximation used to measure the impact of state intervention 
on consumer welfare. As long as demand curve is observable, the EIV is 
measurable. 
Comparative Static Analysis 
Changes in prices, income, and EIV due to changes in the state price and 
quota will normally affect the quantities demanded. To examine the effect, take 
total differentiation of (5), (6) and (7): 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) - PrdG - PxdX - - di - dEIV + GdPr + XdPx. 
Note that dEIV - G,dPr - G,dP, + (Pr - P,)dG,. To solve this system of three 
equations with three unknowns, dG, dX, dA, the terms on the right-hand side must 
be regarded as constant. The array of the coefficient formed by (12) to (14) is 
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the determinant of the bordere.d Hessian: 
(15) 
Denoting this determinant by D and the cofactor of the element in the i th row 
and jth column by DiJ• the solutions of (12), (13) and (14) by Cramer's rule are 
(16) dG - [D11dPf + D21dPx + D31(-di - dEIV +GdPf + XdPx) ]/D 
and 
(17) dX - [D 12dPf + D22dPx + D32 (-di - dEIV +GdPf + XdPx)/D. 
Direct Effects 
Assuming that I, P5 , G5 , and Px do not change, and dividing both sides of 
(16) by dPf, gives: 
(18) 
The partial derivative on the left-hand side of (18) is the rate of change 
of the consumer's purchase of G with respect to change in Pf, all other things 
being equal. Henderson and Quandt (1980) show that the rate of change with 
respect to income, given unchanged prices, is 
(19) ac;ai - - D31/D. 
It is worth noting that the rate of change with respect to equivalent income 
variation is the same as the rate of change with respect to income. That is, 
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(20) 8G/8EIV D31/D. 
When a price change is compensated by an income change such that the consumer 
remains on the initial utility level, then 
(21) 
Equation (18) can now be rewritten as 
(22) 
Changes in the market grain price cause direct and indirect effects. The direct 
effect, as described by the first and second terms on the right-hand side, 
expresses the rate of change compensated by an income change that leaves the 
consumers on their initial indifference curve and the rate of change due to 
change in real income as a result of price change. The indirect effect of 
the third term indicates how consumers respond to a change in own market price 
as a result of implied income effect through their equivalent income variation, 
given state price subsidy of some grain commodity. 
Equation (22) can be modified as 
(23) 8G/8Pf - (8G/8Pf)u•oonst - (G - G,) (8G/8I)prioes•oonst 
and it is known as the Slutsky equation. The quantity 8G/8Pf is the slope of the 
ordinary demand curve for G. The first term on the right-hand side is the slope 
of the compensated demand curve for G. It is the substitution effect, or the 
rate at which the consumer substitutes G for X when the price of G changes and 
the consumer moves along a given indifference curve. The second term on the 
right is the income effect, or the rate at which the consumer alters the purchase 
of G with a change in real income, given constant prices. Income now includes 
the normal concept of income plus the equivalent income variation. The sum of 
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the two rates equals the total rate of change for G as the free market price of 
G changes. 
Henderson and Quandt (1980) proved that the sign of the substitution effect 
is always negative, so the compensated demand curve is always downward sloping. 
The income effect may be either sign because the commodity may be either a normal 
or an inferior good. 
The Slutsky equation can be expressed in terms of price and income 
elasticities as 
(24) 
The price elasticity of the ordinary demand curve, e11 , equals the price 
elasticity of the compensated demand curve, ell• less the corresponding income 
elasticity, ry 1 , multiplied by the proportion of total expenditure spent on a 
grain commodity from the free market, fi 1 • Thus, the ordinary demand curve will 
have a greater demand elasticity than the compensated demand curve if the income 
elasticity of demand is positive for a normal good. This more elastic ordinary 
demand curve can be deleted when the price subsidy is in line with quota. The 
higher the subsidized quota is, the less elastic the ordinary demand curve will 
be. The ordinary demand curve without government intervention will be much more 
elastic than it would be with intervention. 
The Slutsky equation and its elasticity representation for commodity X, in 
which there is no government intervention, are 




where <22 is the price elasticity of the ordinary demand curve, E22 is the price 
elasticity of the compensated demand curve, p2 is the proportion of total 
expenditure for X, and ~ 2 is the income elasticity of demand. Equations (25) and 
(26) are the standard forms ascribed by classical consumer theory. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the Slutsky equation will not be altered unless there is 
government intervention for that commodity. 
Cross Effects 
The Slutsky equation and its elasticity expression for changes in the demand 
for a grain commodity resulting from changes in the price of a nongrain commodity 
are: 
(27) 8G/8Px ~ (8G/8Px)u=oonst - X(8G/8I)prioes=oonst 
and 
(28) 
Henderson and Quandt (1980) define the first term on the right-hand side as the 
cross-substitution effect and its sign is unknown. The second term on the right-
hand side, the income elasticity of the grain commodity multiplied by the 
proportion of total expenditure for the nongrain commodity, yields income effect. 
The total effect of a change in the price of the nongrain commodity on the demand 
for the grain commodity is the sum of the cross-substitution effect and the 
income effect, the same as in the conventional description. 
When the market price of the grain commodity changes, the impact on nongrain 





Although the cross-substitution effect is of standard form, the income effect is 
not. The income elasticity of the grain commodity is multiplied by the 
proportion of expenditure rather than for the total grain commodity, but, in this 
case for the grain commodity from the free market. 
The substitution effect on the ith commodity resulting from a change in the 
jth price is the same as the substitution effect on jth commodity due to a change 
in the ith price (Henderson and Quandt 1980). The sum of the compensated demand 
elasticities for grain commodities as a result of changes in P, and Px equals 
zero. This feature holds for the nongrain commodity. 
The sum of the negative of the ordinary demand elasticities for G as a result 
of changes in P, and Px is, however, not equal to the income elasticity of demand 
for G, as defined in classical consumer theory. This is attributed to the fact 
that the income effect from the change in market grain price accounts for the 
income elasticity of demand for the grain commodity multiplied by the proportion 
of expenditure for the grain commodity from the free market. This same situation 
also applies to the nongrain commodity. 
Policy Analysis 
Impacts of State Grain Prices on the Demand for Grain 
Consider first a change in the state grain price, other things being 
equal. Dividing both sides of Equation (16) by aP, gives the changes in the 
demand for the grain commodity: 
(31) 8G/8P, - G,(BG/81), 
and its elasticity expression is 
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(32) 
The state price elasticity of the ordinary demand curve of the grain commodity 
is equal to the income elasticity of demand for the grain commodity, multiplied 
by the proportion of expenditure for the grain commodity from state rationing. 
When the state grain price increases, the total ordinary demand for the grain 
commodity will decrease if it is a normal good or demand will increase if it 
is an inferior good. These results indicate that a change in the state grain 
price involves no substitution effect. Consumers respond to a change in state 
grain price as an anticipated income effect through changes in their equivalent 
income variation, other things being equal. As indicated in Equations (19) and 
(20), consumers perceive a change in equivalent income variation due to a change 
in state grain price as the same as a change in real income and reallocate their 
resources even if market prices do not change. 
Note that the effect of a change in state grain price on the demand is the 
same as the indirect effect of a change in market grain price on demand. 
Now, if the change in demand for a grain commodity due to a change in the 
state grain price is taken into account, the sum of the negative of the ordinary 
demand elasticity for G, as a result of changes in Pf, P5 , and Px, is 
(33) 
That is, the income elasticity of demand for the grain commodity equals the 
negative of the sum of ordinary price elasticities of demand with respect to own 
market price, own state price, and nongrain price. 
Impacts of a State Quota on Grain Demand 
The changes in demand for a grain commodity from a change in the state grain 
quota are given as: 
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(34) ac;ac. - (P, - P.) (8G/8I), 
and its elasticity expression is 
(35) <1q - (EIV/I)~,. 
The state quota elasticity of the ordinary grain demand curve is equal to the 
income elasticity of demand for the grain multiplied by the ratio of equivalent 
income variation to income. When the state grain quota increases, the total 
ordinary demand for grain will increase if it is a normal good or demand will 
decrease if it is an inferior good. 
Like a change in state grain price, a change in state grain quota involves 
no substitution effect. Consumers respond to a change in state grain quota as 
an anticipated income effect through changes in their equivalent income 
variation, other things being equal. And this response induces consumers to 
reallocate their resources as they do when there is a change in real income, even 
if all prices are unchanged. Given income elasticity of demand for the grain 
commodity, the larger the disparity between market price and state price, the 
more elastic the ordinary demand curve will be. 
Impacts of the State Grain Price on Demand for the Nongrain Commodity 
If all other parameters remain constant, changes in the state grain price 
will affect the demand for nongrain commodity as 
(36) 8X/8P,-- G,(BX/81), 
and the corresponding elasticity expression is 
(37) 
The state price elasticity of the ordinary demand curve of nongrain commodity 
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is equal to the income elasticity of demand for this commodity multiplied by the 
proportion of expenditure for the grain commodity from state rationing, {3 •• When 
the state grain price increases, the total ordinary demand for the nongrain 
commodity will decrease if it is a normal good or demand will increase if it is 
an inferior good. 
These results show that a change in state grain price has no substitution 
effect on the nongrain commodity. Consumers perceive a change in state grain 
price as an anticipated income effect through changes in their equivalent income 
variation, other things being equal. Consumers respond to a change in equivalent 
income variation due to a change in the state grain price in the same way as they 
do to a change in real income; they reallocate their resources even if market 
prices are unchanged. 
When all the changes in Pr, P5 , and Px are taken into account, the sum of the 
negative of the ordinary demand elasticity for X is equal to the income 
elasticity of demand for the nongrain commodity, 
(38) -(<zl + 'zs + <zz) - -<ezl + ezz) + (<>z + {3, + {3,) - ~2) - ~2 . 
Impacts of the State Quota on the Demand for the Nongrain Commodity 
The changes in demand for nongrain commodity as a result of a change in the 
state grain quota is given as: 
(39) ax;ac,- (P£- P,)(ax;ar), 
and its elasticity expression is 
(40) <zq - (EIV/1)~ 2 . 
The state quota elasticity of the ordinary demand curve for the nongrain 
commodity is equal to its income elasticity of demand multiplied by the ratio of 
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equivalent income variation to income. When the state grain quota increases, 
demand for the nongrain commodity will increase if it is a normal good or demand 
will decrease if it is an inferior good. 
Again a change in the state grain quota involves no substitution effect. 
Consumers respond to a change in the state grain quota as an anticipated income 
effect through changes in their equivalent income variation, other things being 
equal. And consumers reallocate their resources as they will do in responding 
to a change in real income even if all prices are unchanged. Given income 
elasticity of demand for the nongrain commodity, the larger the difference 
between market price and state price is, the more elastic the ordinary demand 
curve will be. 
Summary and Policy Conclusions 
Under the current mixed system of planning and markets in China, marginal 
decisions of consumers are affected only by market prices. Marginal decision 
rules in market economics are directly applicable even though the government 
plays the major role in consumption. The demand functions in such a mixed system 
involve not only market prices and income but also equivalent income variation, 
where is the difference between market price and state price multiplied by the 
state quota. 
Nongrain commodity price changes involving no government intervention have 
a substitution effect and an income effect on the demand for commodities. Grain 
commodity price changes with government intervention, however, have an additional 
indirect effect on commodity demand through changes in the consumer's equivalent 
income variation. Besides substitution and income effects, consumers respond to 
changes in that price as an implied income effect in the same way they respond 
to changes in real income. This indirect effect will vanish if the state grain 
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price changes by the same proportion, and if the state grain quota remains 
constant. 
A change in state grain price has no substitution effect. Consumers would 
perceive the change as an anticipated income effect through their equivalent 
income variation. Thus, the magnitude of the impacts of a change in state grain 
price on consumer demands depends on income elasticity of demand for that 
commodity and proportion of total expenditure for the grain commodity from 
rationing. State price level does play a role in consumer resource allocation. 
Similarly, a change in state grain quota has no substitution effect. 
Consumers respond to the change as an implied income effect through changes in 
their equivalent income variation. The magnitude of the effects on consumer 
demand relies on income elasticity of demand for that commodity and the ratio of 
equivalent income variation to income. 
Policy formulation in such a mixed system is more complicated. It is the 
free market price that primarily determines consumption decisions. But, if the 
free market is treated as a residual in the state planning process, unintended 
price variation may have significant impacts on producer resource allocation 
decisions and income. It is, therefore, important not to ignore the free market 
in this mixed system. 
The state grain price and state grain quota work together like a consumer 
subsidy through income transfer. Given income elasticity of demand, the 
instrument of the state grain quota will have significant impacts on demand only 
if the disparity between market price and state price is very large. By 
contrast, the instrument of the state grain price will have significant effects 
on demand only if the state grain quota is sufficiently large. The evidence 
presented here supports arguments for increasing the state grain price and/or 
decreasing the state grain quota in order to monitor closely grain consumption 
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and reduce the government's financial burden. 
Removing the state grain quota and price subsidy will make ordinary demand 
curves more elastic. However, the market equilibrium price will go down as the 
demand curve shifts back from decreases in the consumer's equivalent income 
variation. As a result, the new market equilibrium price will decline and 
the consumer's real income will increase. If the loss of equivalent income 
variation can be compensated by the rise in real income, consumers may not be 
worse off. Furthermore, if the government wishes to convert its price subsidy 
to an income subsidy, consumers can reach a higher utility level by spreading the 







Figure 1. Consumer equivalent income variation 
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